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Abstract: 
Although the literature on the political economy of public finance is already quite 
extensive, most articles analyse the behaviour of central governments. 
Furthermore, studies about the Portuguese economy are scarce. The present article 
contributes for a better understanding of these phenomena by testing the influence 
of political factors on municipal expenditure decisions in Portugal. The dataset 
used in the empirical work has information for all mainland Portuguese 
municipalities from 1979 to 2000. The tests performed reveal that local politicians 
increase capital expenditures before elections, particularly on roads and streets 
construction. Results also indicate that when the mayor belongs to the party that 
dominates the municipal assembly capital expenditures are higher. Finally, no 
support was found for partisan effects on incumbents’ investment expenditures 
choices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a growing body of literature analysed the impact of political 
factors on economic policy decisions, particularly on fiscal policy. Although the 
international research on this topic is already quite extensive,1 most papers analyse 
de behaviour of central governments and very few focus on local authorities. 
Furthermore, the number of studies investigating the Portuguese reality, both at the 
central or local governments, is extremely small. The present research contributes 
for a better understanding of these phenomena in Portugal. It studies the impact of 
political factors on capital expenditure decisions in a sample composed of all 
mainland Portuguese municipalities, over a twenty two year period (from 1979 to 
2000) 
This article reveals that local politicians increase capital expenditures 
before elections, particularly on items highly visible by the electorate such as 
streets and roads construction. This behaviour is in accordance with the rational 
opportunistic theory, which predicts that incumbents increase public expenditures 
before elections in order to appear more competent, and improve their chances of 
winning the election. Evidence also suggests that the size of the opportunistic cycle 
does not depend on whether the mayor’s political party has a majority in the local 
assembly. Political cohesion is, however, positively associated with the amount of 
capital expenditures spent in the municipalities. Regarding partisan theory, the tests 
performed reveal that the mayor’s ideology does not determine the type of 
privileged investments. 
                                                 
1 See Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997), Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) 
for comprehensive discussions on this topic. 
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The next section briefly reviews the literature on the political economy of 
public finance. Section 3 presents a short digression on municipalities in Portugal, 
while section 4 describes the dataset. The empirical strategy used to investigate the 
impact of elections on municipal expenditures is explained in section 5 and the 
results obtained are present in section 6. Finally, conclusions are reported.  
 
2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
In the seventies, two seminal contributions, Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs 
(1977), initiated the literature on political business cycles2 (PBC). Nordhaus (1975) 
presented a model of opportunistic incumbents that manipulate the economy before 
elections in order to appear more competent and increase their probability of re-
election. The model is based on adaptive expectations of voters and admits that 
incumbents are able to push the economy to their preferred combination of 
inflation and unemployment by manipulating fiscal and monetary policy. 
Therefore, before elections, incumbents generate an inflation surprise to decrease 
the unemployment rate and conquer a higher number of votes. Hibbs (1977) 
introduced the first partisan model. Shortly, it predicts that once in power, 
politicians try to favour the groups of the population by which they were elected. 
Parties have, therefore, different objectives for economic variables. In particular, 
Hibbs admits that left wing parties are supported by the lower classes of society, 
who suffer the most with unemployment increases, and consequently, when 
elected, they are mainly concerned with reducing unemployment. On the other 
hand, right wing parties obtain most of their votes from the upper classes of the 
                                                 
2 For extensive revisions on the topic see Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997) and Price 
(1997). 
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population, who dislike inflation more than unemployment. When in office they, 
therefore, focus on price stabilization. Like in Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977) 
admits a short-run Phillips curve exploitable through monetary and fiscal policy. 
The rational expectations revolution required the reformulation of the first 
generation of PBC models. The idea that incumbents could systematically 
manipulate economic variables through aggregate demand shocks became no 
longer tenable. The introduction of rational expectations in the models gave birth to 
a second wave of contributions. Alesina (1987) presented the first rational partisan 
model. According to Alesina (1987) the existence of uncertainty regarding the 
ideology of the party that will win an election may cause inflation prediction errors 
for the period immediately after the balloting.3 This makes it possible for 
governments to cause short run deviations in real economic variables from their 
natural rates immediately after elections. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Person and Tabellini (1990) developed 
opportunistic models with rational expectations. According to them, governments 
are opportunistic but differ in their level of competence, which they know before 
the electorate. Therefore, before elections, incumbents have an incentive to take 
advantage of this asymmetry of information by manipulating economic policy 
variables in order to appear the more competent possible.  
Since fiscal policy is, for most voters, an obscure subject, it is very 
attractive for manipulation by opportunistic governments. Opportunistic behaviour 
leads to an increase in public expenditures or a reduction of taxes before elections 
to transmit the idea that incumbents are doing a good job with public financial 
                                                 
3 Following Hibbs (1977), Alesina (1987) assumes that parties’ ideology conditions their 
inflation preferences. Right wing parties prefer lower inflation rates than left wing parties. 
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accounts. The higher the quantity of public goods/services a government can offer 
for a given amount of public revenue, the more competent it is. 
Three main results emerge from the international literature testing political 
business cycles on central governments. First, most authors find evidence in favour 
of partisan theory, with stronger support for rational models. Second, partisan 
effects are stronger in countries with stable governments and clear ideological 
differences among competing parties. Third, evidence in favour of opportunistic 
business cycles is weak.  
Recently, a growing body of literature has investigated the impact of other 
political factors on public finance. Issues such as the use of debt as a strategic 
variable (Person and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), the influence of 
budgetary institutions (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), the effect of conflicts among 
parties forming governmental coalitions (Roubini and Sachs, 1989), and the impact 
of “wars of attrition” between groups with conflicting objectives on the timing of 
fiscal stabilizations (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) have been addressed.4 Despite the 
extensive number of empirical studies using cross-country data to investigate 
central governments’ fiscal policy decisions, the number of publications 
performing similar analysis for state or local governments within countries other 
than the U.S. and Germany is quite scarce.5   
                                                 
4 See chapter 9 in Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997), Drazen (2000) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2002) for comprehensive discussions on these topics. 
5 For the U.S. state and local governments see Gramlich (1991), Alt and Lowry (1994), 
Poterba (1994), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Bohn and Inman (1996) and Sørensen, Wu 
and Yosha (2001). For the German Länders see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). 
For the Russian regions see Akhemedov, Ravichev and Zhuravskaya (2002), for Canadian 
provincial governments see Blais and Nadeau (1992), and for Israel see Rosenberg (1992). 
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The Portuguese reality is under researched both at the national and sub-
national levels.6 The present work intends to fill this gap in the literature by 
investigating the influence of political factors on Portuguese local governments’ 
expenditure decisions. Portuguese Municipalities are used as laboratory.  
 
3. MUNICIPALITIES IN PORTUGAL 
This section presents some background information on institutional and 
public finance rules in Portuguese Municipalities. Democracy was re-established in 
Portugal in April 25, 1974 after 48 years of dictatorship.7 Portuguese municipalities 
were formally established in the 1976 Constitution and the first municipal elections 
took place in December 1976. In mainland Portugal there are currently 278 
municipalities.  
Local governments are concerned with improving the well-being of the 
population that live in their territories. They promote social and economic 
development, territory organization, and supply local public goods (water and 
sewage, transports, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, defence of the 
environment and protection of the civil population).8  
                                                 
6 There are only two studies analyzing Portuguese local governments. Baleiras and Costa 
(2001) work with a sample of thirty Portuguese mainland municipalities, from 1977 to 
1993. Marta (2000) investigates municipalities from the Northern region of Portugal. 
7 The number of observations for studies intended to analyze the behavior of Portuguese 
central governments is small. Since the end of the dictatorship there were only 10 
legislative elections in Portugal. Research on local governments provides many more 
degrees of freedom. 
8 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of local governments. 
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There are no disparities in budgeting rules and institutions among 
Portuguese mainland municipalities,9 although the law regulating local public 
finances changed during the period considered.10 Municipalities are financially 
autonomous. They have their own employees and patrimony. Each year the 
executive organ of the municipality (town council) proposes to the legislative organ 
(municipal assembly) the local budget and the plan of activities, whose approval 
does not require the agreement of a higher-ranked authority. As part of the general 
government sector, local authorities are, however, subject to several control 
mechanisms by central government agencies. These control mechanisms limit their 
access to revenue and their expenditure choices.11  
Political business cycles are more likely to occur on items whose timing of 
implementation is controlled by the mayor and which are visible to the electorate. 
Local Portuguese politicians have more freedom to manipulate municipalities’ 
expenditures than revenues.12 Therefore, our analysis concentrates on the former 
and, in particular, on capital expenditures. Current expenditure decisions are 
subject to greater rigidity. Items such as salaries don’t have enough flexibility to be 
changed before elections, since they are regulated by rigid labour contracts, both in 
terms of duration and wage rates. 
                                                 
9 Overseas municipalities, belonging to the islands of Madeira and Açores, are treated 
differently from those in the mainland. 
10 Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87, and currently Law 46/98. 
11 For a description of local public finances, rules and performance, in Portugal see 
Baleiras (1998). 
12 Transfers from the Central Administration and the E.U. represent a very important 
source of funding for municipalities. 
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Capital expenditures in Portuguese municipalities include investment 
expenditures implemented by the municipality13 and capital transfers to the 
counties (“freguesias”). Investment expenditures are divided in four categories, 
some with sub-components: (1) acquisition of land, (2) housing, (3) other 
buildings, and (4) diverse constructions. The “Other buildings” item includes: (3.1) 
sports, recreational and schooling infrastructures; (3.2) social equipment; and (3.3) 
other. The “Diverse constructions” category is composed of the following items: 
(4.1) overpasses, streets and complementary work; (4.2) sewage; (4.3) water 
captation, treatment and distribution; (4.4) rural roads; (4.5) infrastructures for 
solid waste treatment; and (4.6) other. 
 
4. THE DATASET 
This paper investigates the capital expenditure accounts of all mainland 
Portuguese municipalities (278). The period under analysis goes from 1979 to 
2000, covering six electoral terms.  
Data on the municipalities’ area and the local accounts was obtained from 
the Municipalities General Direction’s (“Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais”) 
annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances).  This journal 
exists from 1978 to 1983 and from 1986 to 1999. For the two missing years, 1984 
and 1985, data was obtained directly from the municipalities’ official accounts. 
Data collection is still under process. We currently have 126 observations for 1984 
and 130 for 1985. 
                                                 
13 The delimitation of areas of public investment between the central and local 
administration was defined in decree-law 77/84 and law 159/99. 
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Data on municipal area and population was acquired from the Marktest’s 
Sales Index dataset and consumer price indexes from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral 
results, were obtained from the National Electoral Commission (“Comissão 
Nacional de Eleições”) and from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the 
Electoral Process (“Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral”) 
of the Internal Affairs Ministry. 
 
5. THE METHODOLOGY 
This paper attempts to determine the impact of political factors on 
Portuguese Municipal total capital expenditures and its components, namely 
whether there is evidence of political business cycles. It concentrates on the 
expenditure side since local governments have more freedom to manipulate 
expenditures than revenues.  
The empirical work starts by analysing total capital expenditures and total 
investment. For these two series the baseline model consists of the following 
specification: 
 
Expit = αi + β(L)Expit + χCap_Transfit + δPElectit + εMajorityit + 
φ(Maj*PElect)it + γ(ReCand*PElect)it  + eit             (1) 
 
Where the dependent variable, Expit, represents real per capita total capital 
expenditures or real per capita total investment. Both series are measured in real 
terms, to control for price increases over time, and they are defined in per capita 
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terms in order to take into account size differences among municipalities. (L)Expit 
are lags of the dependent variable.14   
To control for fixed differences in capital expenditures among 
municipalities, dummies for all municipalities except one were included in the 
model (αi).15 Real per capita capital transfers for each municipality (Cap_Transfit) 
is used as a control variable. Capital transfers include, among others, transfers from 
the Central Administration (namely through the Equilibrium Financial Fund) and 
from the European Union, such as the structural funds. They represent around 70% 
of total capital municipal revenues. Their evolution is, therefore, likely to limit the 
use of capital expenditures with electoral purposes. This variable is also used to 
control for changes in the macroeconomic situation of the country over time.  
In order to test if local incumbents behave opportunistically before elections 
by increasing capital expenditures, mandates were divided in pre and post-electoral 
periods. Two pre-electoral periods (PElect) are considered alternatively: the 
election year; and, the election year and the year before.16 Two dummy variables 
(Elect_Year and Year_Bef_El) were created corresponding to these specific years. 
A positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficients associated with them.  
                                                 
14 The optimal number of lags was determined according to their statistical significance 
and the absence of auto-correlation. 
15 An F-test on the global significance of these variables allowed us to reject the hypothesis 
that they are globally not significant with a 1% significance level. A Hausman test 
performed to determine whether a random effects model would outperform the fixed 
effects model, suggested that the estimation of a fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
16 The election year is considered as pre-electoral since municipal elections always took 
place in December. In Portugal, municipal election dates are exogenously set. Until 1985 
they took place every three years and since then they occur every four years. Municipal 
election dates were the following: December 12, 1976; December 16, 1979; December 12, 
1982; December 15, 1985; December 17, 1989; December 12, 1993; December 14, 1997; 
and December 16, 2001. 
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If the mayor’s party has an overall majority in the municipal assembly, 
there is greater probability that the latter will approve a budget and a plan of 
activities that reflects her/his preferences. Therefore, the degree of political 
cohesion may influence the capacity to implement investment projects and the 
occurrence of political cycles. In order to test this hypothesis a dummy variable 
(Majority) was created, that takes the value of one when the local incumbent’s 
party has an overall majority in the municipal assembly, and zero otherwise. 
Interactions of this variable with those used to test opportunistic cycles 
(Maj*PElect) were also introduced in the model.  
Since politicians running for another term may have a stronger incentive to 
behave opportunistically before elections than those who are not, two dummy 
variables were created to identify the municipalities where the mayor is running 
again for office. ReCan*PElect assumes the value of one in the pre election period 
when the mayor is running for another term and zero otherwise.  
To refine the analysis, investment expenditures were disaggregated in its 
components, which required the definition of another model. Because the 
characteristics of the municipalities, such as its population density (Pop_Densit) 
and the percentages of the population having less than 15 years (%PopUnder15it) 
or more than 65 years (%PopOver65it), may influence local governments’ 
investment priorities, these control variables were added to the model described in 
equation (1).17 The population density was included to capture the municipalities’ 
degree of urbanization. Individuals under 15 years or over 65 years have specific 
                                                 
17 The inclusion of a variable measuring the wealth of the municipalities would be 
desirable. Unfortunately for a sample with this time dimension (1979-2000) such a variable 
has not yet been found. 
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needs regarding schooling, healthcare, elderly care, etc..18 The stronger these 
groups are the more pressure they are likely to exert on local governments to invest 
on items that fulfil their needs. 
Taking into account Hibbs’ partisan theory according to which incumbents 
try to favour the groups of the population by which they were elected, one would 
expect the mayors’ ideology to condition the type of public investment they 
privilege. In particular, left-wing incumbents are expected to attribute higher 
priority to investments that benefit the lower classes of the population. Tests of 
partisan effects were performed in investment components by including as an 
independent variable a dummy (Right) that assumes the value of one when the 
municipality is governed by a right-wing incumbent and a value of zero 
otherwise.19 According to partisan theory, a negative sign is expected for the 
estimated coefficient associated with this variable when the dependent variable is 
an item of capital expenditures that contributes more for the well-being of the less 
favoured. In sum, the model used for each investment component was the 
following:20 
 
Expit = αi + β(L)Expit + χCap_Transfit + δPop_Densit + ε%PopUnder15it + 
φ%PopOver65it + γPElectit + ηMajorityit + ι(Maj*PElect)it + 
ϕ(ReCand*PElect)it  + Rightit + eit                      (2) 
                                                 
18 In Portugal municipalities are responsible among other thinks, for public kinder gardens, 
elementary schools, day centers for the elderly, home for the aged, and primary healthcare. 
19 The Socialist Party (PS), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and the People’s 
Democratic Union (UDP) were considered as left, while the People’s Democratic Party / 
Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) and the Democratic and Social Center / People’s 
Party (CDS/PP) were classified as right. 
20 As before, they are all measured in real per capita terms. 
 12
 
 To refine partisan theory tests, regressions were also ran on a model using 
as dependent variable the weight of each investment component on total 
investment. Explanatory variables were the same as those considered in equation 
(2) with the exception of Cap_Transfit, ajorityit and Maj*PElectit and 
ReCand*PElectit that were excluded. 
 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section starts by presenting some descriptive statistics of the main 
variables used in the empirical work (table 1). OLS estimations, controlling for 
fixed effects, of the models described above are then presented.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
We first tested the influence of political factors on real per capita total 
capital expenditures. Results, shown in table 2, clearly indicate that capital 
expenditures are positively affected by the amount of capital transfers received by 
the municipalities. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
The estimation results presented in column 1 of table 2 reveal that total 
capital expenditures increase in election years, suggesting that Portuguese local 
governments behave opportunistically. The estimated coefficient associated with 
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the dummy variable Majority shows that municipalities where the mayor’s party 
has an overall majority in the municipal assembly have greater capital expenditures 
than the others. However, the interaction of this variable with those used to capture 
the pre-electoral period (Maj*Elect_Year) indicate that political cohesion does not 
influence the dimension of the opportunistic cycle. Regarding the re-candidature 
effect (ReCan*Elect_Year), evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
incumbents who run for another term are more prone to increase capital expenses, 
in order to appear more competent and win the election, than those who are not 
running again. A possible explanation for this result is that, even when incumbents 
are not running for re-election, they generate an opportunistic cycle in order to 
support their political party’s candidate, whose votes depend on their popularity.21  
Because some municipal investments may require more than one year to be 
accomplished, the dummy for the years immediately before elections 
(Year_Bef_El) was introduced in the specification (column 2).22 Although the 
estimated coefficient for this dummy is positive, as expected, it turned out not to be 
statistically significant.   
Regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 are similar to the previous ones 
except that they exclude the interaction variables that were not statistically 
significant in previous regressions (Maj*Elect_Year, Maj*Year_Bef_El, 
ReCan*Elect_Year and ReCand*Year_Bef_El). Results are basically the same, 
                                                 
21 To refine this result data on the number of consecutive mandates of each mayor is being 
collected. It is plausible that incumbents running for office for the third or more time do 
not need to woo the electorate before elections since their competence has already been 
revealed in previous mandates. 
22 Recall that until 1985 municipal elections took place every three years while after that 
they occurred every four years.  
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except that the dummy for the years immediately before elections is now highly 
statistically significant. 
Under the hypothesis that local politicians may have an interest on who 
wins the national elections, a dummy variable equal to one in years in which 
legislative elections occurred and zero otherwise (Leg_Elect_Year) was introduced 
in the model. Column 5 presents the results for this specification. The positive and 
statically significant estimated coefficient associated with this variable reveals that, 
in fact, mayors increase capital expenditures in legislative election years. This 
suggests that local politicians also try to appear more competent before the 
electorate in legislative elections years in order to attract votes for the party they 
belong to.23 
The paper proceeds by estimating analogous regressions for real per capita 
total investment. As can be seen in Table 3 results are essentially the same. Local 
politicians increase investment expenditures before municipal elections, 
particularly in balloting years. Municipalities governed by mayors belonging to the 
party that dominates the municipal assembly spend more on investment items than 
more politically fragmented municipalities. Finally, investment expenditures are 
higher in legislative election years. It should however be noted that in regression 
results presented in columns 2, 4 and 5 there is weak evidence that mayors who are 
running again for office increase investment expenditures in pre electoral periods 
more than those who are not re-running. This effect is nevertheless only visible in 
the years immediately before elections (ReCan*Year_Bef_Elect). 
 
                                                 
23 The correlation between the legislative election years dummy and dummies for 
municipal election years is -.03, and with the preceding year is -.46. 
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[Table 3] 
 
To refine the analysis the main components of investment (land acquisition, 
housing, other buildings, and several constructions), as well as their sub-categories, 
were also investigated. Three additional control variables (population density, 
percentage of the population under 15 years and percentage of the population over 
65 years) and the dummy for the mayors’ ideology (right=1) were added to the 
previous model (equation 2). Results also stress that the dimension of the 
opportunistic cycle does not depend on the existence of a majority in the municipal 
assembly of the mayor’s party, nor on the fact that the incumbent is running again 
for office. The variables used to test these hypotheses were therefore excluded from 
the regressions.  
As can be seen from table 4, capital transfers continues to be a highly 
significant variable explaining expenditures on investment components. The new 
control variables do not seem to exert a strong influence on the series, with the 
exception of the population density on “Housing”24 and the percentage of the 
population under 15 years old on “Land Acquisition”. Political factors have 
different impacts on these items. Opportunistic cycles are stronger on “Several 
Constructions” and “Other Building,” and are not visible on “Housing” 
expenditures. For the first two series, evidence further confirmed that opportunistic 
                                                 
24 The estimated coefficient for the population density is significant and negative for 
“Housing”. Taking into account that Lisbon and Porto are the two biggest cities in Portugal 
and have a population density much higher (8 019 and 7 202 inhabitants by Km2 
respectively) than the rest of the country (224 inhabitants by Km2), tests were also 
performed on a sample excluding these two municipalities. Results did not change, except 
that for “Housing” the density of the population turned out to be statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level and positively signed.  
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effects exist both in the election year and the preceding one, but they are stronger 
in the election year. There is strong evidence suggesting that municipalities’ 
political cohesion increases expenditures in “Other Buildings” and weak evidence 
pointing that the same effect occurs on “Housing” expenditures. Results suggest 
that the mayor’s ideology has no impact on expenditures decisions. On “Housing” 
expenditures the coefficient associated with the dummy for right-wing oriented 
incumbents turned out to be marginally statistically significant but with a sign that 
is contrary to our prior. Since the poorer are the main beneficiary of municipalities’ 
investments on housing, according to Hibbs’ partisan theory one would expect the 
estimated coefficient for this variable to be negatively signed. In legislative 
election years’ expenditures on “Land Acquisition” and “Other Buildings” tend to 
increase, but the same does not happen on the other two series considered. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Because expenditures on “Other Buildings” and “Several constructions” are 
disaggregated in several items we then refined even further the analysis.25 Table 5 
shows estimation results for the sub-categories of these two series where stronger 
evidence supporting political business cycles was found. All estimation results 
presented support the hypothesis that incumbents increase expenditures in pre-
electoral periods. Furthermore, evidence for this phenomenon is higher in 
                                                 
25 Recall that “Other Buildings” is composed of the following items: “Sports, recreational 
and schooling infrastructures”; “Social equipment”; and “Other”. “Several Constructions” 
includes: “Overpasses, streets and complementary work”; “Sewage”; “Water captation, 
treatment and distribution”; “Rural roads”; “Infrastructures for solid waste treatment”; and 
“Other”. 
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expenditures on water captation, distribution and treatment, and particularly on 
streets/roads and complementary works.  Taking into account that incumbents are 
trying to woo the electorate before elections, it is not surprising that they choose to 
manipulate items that are highly visible to the population.  
 
 [Table 5] 
 
It is also important to mention that, with the exception “Water captation, 
treatment and distribution” and “Rural roads”, none of the regressions ran on 
investment components revealed the existence of partisan effects on local 
governments’ decisions. In order to confirm the robustness of this conclusion, tests 
were also performed on the weight of each type of municipal investment on total 
municipal investment. Once again, with the exception of the two series mentioned 
above, the dummy introduced to capture incumbents’ ideology did not turn out as 
statistically significant. Since investments on water captation, treatment and 
distribution or on rural roads benefit the generality of the population the 
statistically significant coefficient associated with them does not provide support 
for Hibbs’ partisan theory. Contrary to Hibbs’ predictions, we can conclude that 
left-wing oriented incumbents do not seem to invest relatively more on items that 
favour the lower classes of the population such as housing or social equipment.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the impact of political factors on Portuguese 
municipalities’ capital expenditures. It tries to determine whether there is evidence 
of political business cycles and if political cohesion in local governments 
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influences the amount of capital expenditures implemented in the municipalities. 
The dataset constructed has information for all mainland municipalities in Portugal 
over a twenty two year period, from 1979 to 2000.  
 Results obtained clearly show that capital expenditures are higher in the 
second half of the mandates, particularly in election years. The increase of capital 
expenditures before elections reflects the incumbents’ opportunistic behaviour, 
since this may result from an attempt to appear more competent, increase 
popularity, and win the election. An investigation of the municipalities’ investment 
components revealed that it is mainly on items highly visible by the electorate, 
such as roads/streets and complementary works that political cycles occur. The 
increase in capital expenditures occurs not only before municipal elections but also 
in legislative balloting years suggesting that local politicians try to attract votes for 
the party they belong to. 
According to our prior there is evidence that capital expenditures are higher 
in municipalities where the mayor belongs to the party that dominates the 
municipal assembly. However, and contrary to our predictions, the data revealed 
that the size of the political business cycles is not influenced by local governments’ 
political cohesion. It was also possible to conclude that incumbents running for 
another term do not behave more opportunistically the others. A possible 
explanation is that even when not running again for office, incumbents support 
their party’s candidate, whose likelihood of winning the election also depends on 
their party’s perceived competence. 
Regarding ideological considerations, we found no evidence of partisan 
effects. Tests were performed on investment components series, as well as on the 
weight of each investment category on total investment. No substantial evidence 
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was found suggesting that left-wing incumbents spend relatively more on 
investment items that favour the poorer groups of the population.  
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Table 1. Data descriptive statistics 
 Variable type Units Mean Max. value Min.value Stand. dev. N. obs. 
Real per capita total capital expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 36.03 287.96 1.89 24.47 5 749 
Real per capita total investment expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 31.81 288.51 1.78 22.51 5 743 
Real per capita land acquisition expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.91 40.99 0 1.83 5 472 
Real per capita housing expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 1.88 100.97 0 4.64 5 473 
Real per capita other buildings expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 5.51 80.65 0 6.40 4 449 
Real per capita sports, recreational and 
schooling infrastructures expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 1.98 59.72 0 3.70 5 473 
Real per capita social equipment expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.31 41.75 0 1.37 5 468 
Real per capita other expenditures  Continuous  1 000 escudos 2.93 61.35 0 4.61 4 424 
Real per capita several constructions expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 20.88 214.70 0 17.86 4 449 
Real per capita overpasses, streets and 
complementary works expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 4.41  84.22 0 5.82 5 470 
Real per capita sewage expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 2.38 69.09 0 3.89 4 450 
Real per capita water capitation, treatment 
and distribution expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 2.94 100.28 0 4.91 4 450 
Real per capita rural roads expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 5.91 152.86 0 8.79 5 474 
Real per capita infrastructures for solid waste 
treatment expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.22 98.90 0 2.07 4 442 
Real per capita other expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 4.01 122.24 0 6.88 4 175 
Real per capita capital transfers expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 26.06 249.74 3.04 19.48 5 741 
Population Density Continuous Inhabitants by Km2 278.64     9 688.55 6.72      877.52 6 053 
Election Year Dummy  0.27 1 0 0.44 6 056 
Election Year and Year Before Dummy  0.54 1 0 0.49 6 056 
Majority Dummy  0.58 1 0 0.49 6 049 
Re-candidate_1 Dummy  0.20 1 0 0.40 5 789 
Re-candidate_2 Dummy  0.42 1 0 0.49 5 631 
Right Dummy  0.47 1 0 0.49 6 049 
Legislative Election Year Dummy  0.36 1 0 0.48 6 056 
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Table 2. Tests on real per capita total capital expenditures  
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Exp(-1) .27    .27 .28          .28 .28 
 (27.04)*** (26.85)*** (27.78)*** (27.89)*** (28.12)*** 
      
Cap_Transf .86 .86 .86 .85 .85 
 (64.28)*** (64.36)*** (65.11)*** (65.12)*** (65.20)*** 
      
Elect_Year 1.91 2.56 1.04    1.94 2.69 
 (2.10)** (2.77)*** (2.93)*** (5.14)*** (6.17)*** 
      
Year_Bef_El  1.04  2.45 3.34 
  (1.21)  (6.94)*** (7.63)*** 
      
Majority 1.62 1.27 1.50 1.55 1.51 
 (3.82)*** (2.55)** (3.89)*** (4.02)*** (3.92)*** 
      
Maj*Elect_Year -.69 -.31    
 (-.91) (-.40)    
      
Maj*Year_Bef_El  .79    
  (1.08)    
      
ReCan*Elect_Year -.25 -.23    
 (-.29) (-.26)    
      
ReCan*Year_Bef_El  1.08    
  (1.37)    
      
Leg_Elect_Year     1.41 
     (3.42)*** 
      
      
Adjusted R2 .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 
N. observat. 5 193 5 087 5 298 5 298 5 298 
      
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
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Table 3. Tests on real per capita total investment expenditures 
 1 2 3 4 5 
        
Exp(-1)    .30 .30 .31 .30 .30 
 (26.43)*** (25.85)*** (26.80)*** (25.85)*** (26.03)*** 
        
Exp(-2) -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.06 
 (-5.63)*** (-4.77)** (-4.95)*** (-4.77)*** (-5.21)*** 
        
Cap_Transf .77 .77 .77 .77 .77 
 (65.38)*** (65.20)*** (65.20)*** (65.24)*** (65.32)*** 
        
Elect_Year 2.01 2.91 2.41 2.96 3.62 
 (2.50)** (3.52)*** (7.34)*** (4.07)*** (4.77)*** 
        
Year_Bef_El  1.05 
  1.46  2.14 
 
 
(1.37) 
  (2.19)**  (3.04)*** 
        
Majority 1.37 1.02 1.28 1.26 1.27 
 (3.44)*** (2.13)** (3.47)*** (3.44)*** (3.46)*** 
        
Maj*Elect_Year -.29 -.65    
 (-.44) (-.83)    
        
Maj*Year_Bef_El  .73    
  (1.09)    
        
ReCand*Elect_Year .38 .41  .40 .30 
 (.50) (.53)  (.52) (.39) 
        
ReCan*Year_Bef_Elect  1.33  1.35 1.35 
  (1.90)*  (1.94)* (1.93)* 
        
Leg_Elect_Year     1.20 
     (3.04)*** 
        
        
Adjusted R2 .82 .83 .82 .83 .83 
N. observat. 4 754 4 648 4 858 4 648 4 648 
        
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
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Table 4. Tests on real per capita investment components   
 Investment Components 
 Land 
Acquisition 
Housing Other Buildings Several 
constructions 
     
Exp(-1) .19 .42 .35 .28 
 (11.51)*** (25.50)*** (20.37)*** (19.92)*** 
     
Exp(-2)  -.12 -.08 -.06 
  (-7.10)*** (-4.53)*** (-4.81)*** 
     
Exp(-3)   -.05  
   (-3.17)***  
     
Cap_Transf .01 .02 .14 .61 
 (7.70)*** (5.47)*** (17.01)*** (47.35)*** 
     
Pop_Density -.0001 -.003 -.0007 .0006 
 (-.43) (-3.83)*** (-.45) (.27) 
     
%PopUnder15 -.03 .01 .04 .05 
 (-2.65)** (.43) (.77) (.69) 
     
%PopOver65 .01 .07 -.02 -.24 
 (.50) (.1.52) (-.29) (-1.93)* 
     
Elect_Year .03 .08 1.21 2.34 
 (.47) (.52) (4.61)*** (5.85)*** 
     
Year_Bef_El .25 .05 .59 1.60 
 (3.45)*** (.36) (2.31)** (4.23)*** 
     
Majority .11 .26 .85 .11 
 (1.67) (1.69)* (3.37)*** (.32) 
     
Right -.03 .36 -.06 .03 
 (-.35) (1.81)* (-.21) (.06) 
     
Leg_El_Year .31 .006 .60 -.18 
 (4.68)*** (.04) (2.34)** (-.46) 
     
     
Adjusted R2 .17 .32 .38 .80 
N. observations 4 805 4 230 3 530 3 807 
     
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
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Table 5. Tests on Other Buildings and Several Constructions components 
 Other 
Buildings 
Several Constructions 
 Other  Overpasses, 
streets & 
compl. work
Sewage Water 
captation, 
treatment 
and 
distribution 
Rural roads Other 
        
Exp(-1) .30  .36 .54 .39 .34 .33 
 (17.50)***  (25.95)*** (28.73)*** (21.99)*** (22.63)*** (18.69)*** 
        
Exp(-2) -.04   -.07 -.06 -.07 -.11 
 (-2.34)***   (-3.57)*** (-3.37)*** (-4.94)*** (-6.42)*** 
        
Exp(-3)     -.07   
     (-3.82)***   
        
Cap_Transf .06  .07 .04 .08 .20 .12 
 (10.93)***  (12.16)*** (9.41)*** (14.01)*** (24.60)*** (14.10)*** 
        
Pop_Density -.0002  -.001 -.0001 -.00005 .0004 .0009 
 (-.25)  (-1.39) (-.16) (-.04) (.30) (.49) 
        
%PopUnder15 .02  -.08 .09 .10 .04 -.07 
 (.56)  (-2.45)** (3.18)*** (2.63)*** (.95) (-1.30) 
        
%PopOver65 .06  .12 .09 -.23 -.42 .14 
 (1.11)  (2.32)** (2.24)** (-3.90)*** (-5.08)*** (1.61) 
        
Elect_Year .80  .79 .06 .26 .80 1.31 
 (4.17)***  (4.11)*** (.48) (1.37) (3.16)*** (4.81)*** 
        
Year_Bef_El .57  .62 .22 .49 .16 .84 
 (3.20)***  (3.23)*** (1.70)* (2.64)*** (.66) (2.97)*** 
        
Majority .39  .09 -.20 .01 .23 .09 
 (2.21)**  (.53) (-1.59) (.09) (.95) (.35) 
        
Right .20  -.02 .10 .46 -.82 .04 
 (.88)  (-.09) (.64) (1.98)** (-2.62)*** (.12) 
        
Leg_El_Year -.02  .29 .34 .49 -.15 -.34 
 (-.11)  (.1.66)* (2.54)** (2.66)*** (-.62) (-1.24) 
        
        
Adjusted R2 .29  .43 .48 .44 .58 .43 
N. observat. 3 802  4 801 3 807 3 530 4 223 3 290 
        
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
 
 
